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Abstract. Fact-check spread is usually performed by a plain tweet with
just the link. Since it is not proper human behavior, it may cause un-
canny, hinder the reader’s attention and harm the counter-propaganda
influence. This paper presents a profile of fact-check link spread in Twit-
ter (suiting for TRL-1) and, as an additional outcome, proposes a pre-
liminary behavior design based on it (suiting for TRL-2). The underlying
hypothesis is by simulating human-like behavior, a bot gets more atten-
tion and exerts more influence on its followers.
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1 Introduction
The spread of fake news on Twitter is commonplace [4]. Despite the existing ef-
forts for identifying and debunking fake-news, initiatives for enlightening people
about facts are still scarce in social-media [8]. This, however, is cornerstone since
this is probably the best-suited counter-propaganda strategy [15]. In other words,
spam-fighting strategies such as detecting and stopping bots suits for automatic
spreading but does not refrain organic spreading. Therefore, efforts such as those
of “guardians”, people who fight against misinformation in social-media [13], are
extremely valuable. However, good-will based guardians cannot face professional
and high-technological propaganda structures [15]; for illustration, an estimate
proportion for true-news and fake-news is of 1:17 [12].
This paper objective is to profile the fact-check spreading behavior in Twitter
for the purpose of proposing a viable design hypothesis for an automatic fact-
check spreading device (called automatic guardian or a-aguardian) to be tested
in near future. The key contribution is the raised profile as it clarifies this type
of behavior and provides some background and insights for automation.
State of the Art. Fake-news spreading is based on computational propaganda.
Propaganda is a fake-news with a political or financial end; computational pro-
paganda is the propaganda carried out by bots and bot-nets [17]. The measures
adopted for hinder propaganda is called counter-propaganda; carrying it out
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using computer support is called computational counter-propaganda [15]. The
most effective counter-propaganda strategy is enlightening people with the truth.
There are two dimensions to be considered, the first is related to the content and
the second to the spreading strategy.
Content-related counter-propaganda is performed through debunking false-
claims with correct information (this is being held by fact-check agencies). These
debunking information must reach people, then a spreading strategy must be
devised. Nevertheless, there are constraints to be honored. Counter-propaganda
cannot use deceptive strategies such as bot-nets with several fake-accounts, i.e.
it must be ethical. This second dimension, however, is not being tackled [8].
An alternative to bot-nets is to consider “digital influencers” for reference.
Digital influencers are people who succeed in influencing people through the
content published in their communication channels . Anyway, such behavior is
analogous to the “super-spreaders” find in the core of bot-nets [11]. Actually,
know a profile to be a bot does not change its influence potential [6], uncon-
sciously yet consistently humans interact with computers as social actors [10].
Yet this requires even simple relationship building features [2].
Methodology. This paper follows the Design Science approach adapted for re-
searching programming. In short, the Ω-knowledge is developed following the
TRL steps and the Λ-knowledge is driven by intuition 3. This paper, as a pro-
file, is aiming TRL-1 (basic principles or the Ω-knowledge). Different methods
were applied according to the research needs. Section 2 uses systematic review,
sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 are based on case study strategy and section 2.5 is the
result of a bibliography survey. Finally, section 3 presents preliminary yet coher-
ent model and design hypothesis for TRL-2 (basic concept for the Λ-knowledge)
for the gathered information.
2 Profiling the Fight against Fake-news
2.1 Virtuous-bots Landscape.
A survey evaluating the use of bots on fighting fake-news was presented in [8]
within the time-frame between 2015-2017. For including the meantime until
July 2019 a quick “re-survey” was carried on by repeating that paper param-
eters (the query submitted to Scopus was TITLE-ABS-KEY((chat* OR social OR
conversation* OR dialogue) W/0 (system OR agent OR bot) AND (fake-news OR
fake news OR misinformation))). The same results hold, there are few researches
concerned with fact-checks spreading [8, 13].
Another survey, this time directed towards Twitter in August 2019, was for
identifying profiles that identify themselves as bots and aimed to fight misinfor-
mation. The query search?q=bot fact fake &src=typed query &f=user retrieved
3 Intuition has been a controversial due to some authors opposed it to reason , however
intuition is the highest skill level attained when the skill is internalized not requiring
extensive councious reasoning . Applied to problem-solving, it the ability to see a
solution beforehand
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3 results of which 1 is currently active. The @unfakingnews is a cyborg work-
ing mostly by re-tweeting information from credited sources. In turn, the query
search?q=bot fact &src=typed query &f=user retrieved 49 results; 19 were clas-
sified as “not applicable” due to not being a bot or active. The remaining were
classified as NLP-based bots (4); non-sense bots (9); link-spread or re-tweeting
bots (5); and fun-facts bots (11). Therefore, 5 out of 49 accounts match the in-
tended behavior of fighting misinformation by spreading factual information yet
only two are active @skeptics bot and @TXLegeFactBot; both for link spreading.
It was not possible to find virtuous-bots replying to other users’ tweets for
warning about a fake-news. This may be due the @DroptheIBot effect. Roughly,
it was a bot when someone said something like “illegal immigrant” it replied
with a politically correct suggestion for an alternative. This profile was reported
many people, and in the end, suspended by Twitter [3]. Somehow it degenerated
into a subverted yet virtuous spam engine.
2.2 A Fact-check Report Profile.
For this paper, a sample of 50 fact-check reports and 7360 related tweets within
a time-frame ranging from September 2008 to July 2019 (excluded repetitions),
was fetched on July 20, 2019. It was selected “trending” fact-check reports col-
lected from the Hot 50 page of Snopes’ website (www.snopes.com) whose link
was queried in Twitter for collecting fact-check link spread tweets cf. [13].
The Snopes uses labels for classifying its fact-check reports according to its
subject and ratings for classifying the truth-level of an analyzed claim. This
helps in understanding how tweets linked to fact-check reports concentrate. The
reports classified as NONE, even being significant, were rejected for this paper.
Figure 1a depicts the most viewed reports are those for debunking false
claims. It is depicted in figure 1c that tweets linked with false-claims are the
most numerous yet well distributed between the sampled reports.In another
hand, figure 1b reveals the most popular subjects being junk-news, politics and
photos, however, as depicted in 1d the highest tweet concentration was about
politics. These same data were also collected one month earlier and four months
after the presented sample suggesting similar results.
Therefore, it is safe to suggest that false-claims debunking with political
subjects is a popular topic for Snopes’ readers both on the website and Twitter.
2.3 A Fact-check Spreading Profile.
False-claim debunking is the rating with better widespread interest distribution.
Other ratings common behavior is one or two reports receiving massive atten-
tion (measured in the number of tweets) whereas the further being neglected. In
this sense, false-claim reports are well-suited for relationship building and work-
ing on the counter-propaganda effort at once. Therefore, in order to increase
effectiveness, this paper focuses on fact-check spread for false-claims.
The sample for false-claims is composed of 1987 tweets, almost one-third of
total sample, scattered through 1483 profiles, a proportion of 1:1.4, suggesting
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a) b)
c) d)
Fig. 1. a) Fact-check reports classified by the claim rating ; b) Fact-check reports classi-
fied by the its subject labels; and c) Tweets spreading fact-check reports links classified
by the analyzed claim rating ; and d) Tweets spreading fact-check reports links classi-
fied by the report’s subject labels. For a remark, a fact-check report may receive several
subject labels, therefore the total size presented in figure (b) is greater than the size of
the sample. The none rating and label are used for uncategorized reports from Snopes.
an absence of bots. These tweets were split into two groups, one for tweets
sent in a profile’s time-line (872, 44%) another for tweets sent in replying for
another profile tweet (1115, 56%). Each group was once again splat (Jaccard
> 0.5 ) in tweets composed almost by the fact-check link (respectively 420 and
544, 48% and 49%) and other in tweets using the fact-check for supporting an
argumentation (respectively 452 and 571, 52% and 51%). Highlight that few
fake-news links are tweeted for replying [11]. Refer to table 1 for a summary.
It was identified two main behaviors for direct link spreading, one is to insert
a link within a tweet and another is by sharing a fact-check from an external
source (such as the agency website). External source sharing is usually followed
by common words such “fact-check” and “via <source>”, etc. whereas directly
inserting a link is actually just the link supported by the Twitter’s thumbnail
feature. For this sample, prevailed external source sharing for direct tweets (re-
spectively 119 and 301, 14% and 36%) and link insertion for replying (539 and
5, 48% and 1%). Opinion tweets, in turn, can be divided into four major groups
warning, informing, explaining, commenting and judging. The warning includes
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Total Only Link Almost Title Opinion Replied Not Replied
Direct 872 (44%) 119 (13.6%) 301 (34.5%) 452 (51.8%) - -
Reply 1115 (56%) 539 (48.3%) 5 (0.4%) 571 (51.2%) - -
Total 1987 658 (33.1%) 306 (15.4%) 1023 (51.5%) 602 (30.3%) 1385 (69.7%)
Table 1. Tweets spreading fact-checks for false-claims tweets.
tweets like This is false, debunked a long while ago. Please see <link> and
judging includes moral opinion such you people are absolute garbage <link>.
There is however a quality difference between direct and reply tweets. Usu-
ally, direct tweets are sent directed towards an “abstract entity”, then the tone
sounds conciliatory. Replying tweets, on another hand, may sound quite aggres-
sive as critics are usually directed to actual people such as who authored or
shared the false-claim. For instance, an impersonal stop lying is not shocking
but by mentioning or replying to someone it may be considered hostile. There-
fore, even possessing similar structures, text generation for opinion tweets is not
straightforward. A caution is not to reproduce TAY’s misbehavior (become an
offender shortly after start learning from social media [16]).
Fake-news is quite a sensitive matter, even a deterministic ALICE-bot for
commenting fake-news, and eventually mentioning or replying people, may easily
become troublesome. For this sample 602 (30%) tweets received a reply and 1385
(70%) did not; most of the replies did not receive any further reply neither from
the original author nor from a third-person. In addition, non-opinion tweets
are responsible for about 50% of link spreading activity. Therefore, considering
the risks shown by TAY and @DroptheIBot, further research on commenting and
replying is required and therefore these subjects were postponed.
2.4 A Profile for the Human Behavior.
Observing the sampled bots and some fact-check agencies it can be realized them
tweet fact-checks as plain tweets whereas human usually includes around four
words for expressing an emotion . Within Internet text messages, emoji, letter
capitalization and the number of dots are usually related on expressing emotions.
By simulating human behavior, it is more likely for a bot to exert influence
within its followers [6], therefore an “asceptical” false-claim fact-check spread
may sound artificial and falls into the uncanny valley [9]. In this situation it is
more likely for a tweet create rejection than calling attention and invite for a
careful reading. Therefore, properly simulating human behavior may be a strate-
gic cornerstone on fighting fake-news. For profiling and enabling proper human-
like text generation, the sampled phrases of direct only-link tweets, excluded
repetitions, presented in figure 2.
2.5 The Enemy Behavior.
Fake-news spreading bots are designed with two major concerns. One is to ef-
ficiently spread fake-news and the other is to avoid social-media surveillance.
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‘#FakeNews’, ‘#repeal2A’, ‘#stopsharingfakenews’, ‘6-29-19’, ‘Actually no’, ‘Another hoax...’,
‘COPY AND PASTE!’, ‘DEBUNKED!!!!!’, ‘FACT CHECK ’, ‘FAKE QUOTE’, ‘FALSE’,
‘FALSE!!!!!’, ‘False’, ‘False quote’, ‘False...’, ‘False/hoax’, ‘Gone viral yet again:’, ‘HOAX!!!’, ‘Hoax!’,
‘Hooks! Sorry.’, ‘Its Fake ’, ‘Just an fyi’, ‘Just. Stop.’, ‘Kayleena: not true’, ‘Listen Up!’, ‘NOT
DEAD!’, ‘NOT TRUE ’, ‘Nah ’, ‘No one got herpes’, ‘No.’, ‘PSA’, ‘y’all:’, ‘Please read...’, ‘Please...
Just stop...‘, ‘Saw that coming...’, ‘Stop falling for hoaxes’, ‘Stop lying.’, ‘Terry Crowl’, ‘The Fonz
is ok.’, ‘The answer is no’, ‘This is 2019 af’, ‘Viga Hall Please note’, ‘Worth reading and watching:’,
‘’, ‘× False.’, ‘ ’.
Fig. 2. Text snippets used within the tweet data-set.
Therefore, the presented behavior for these bots overlaps those concerns into a
coherent behavior. For instance, following circadian rhythms helps in avoiding
surveillance [4] whereas choosing a centered or inflammatory attitude is related
to a bot’s effectiveness [7].
The strategy is often based on “super-spreaders” within the core of a bot-net
who posts the same fake-news up to thousands of times by targeting, through
replies and mentions, users with many followers (this is called amplification) [11].
This is especially common for the early spread (before organic sharing becomes
prevalent). The expectation is to trigger a rumor cascade (people retweeting or
re-claiming a fake-news) [14] by exploring some cognitive biases such as informa-
tion overload, confirmation bias, motivated reasoning, social trust, etc. Highlight,
it is more likely to a human spread a fake-news than a true-news [14].
Since social media profiles become more influencing after a popularity thresh-
old [1], another common strategy is to start deception only after a threshold.
For this strategy proper cultural and psycho-biological behavior plays a major
[6]. Bots are tailored for targeting these triggers and exert influence [11].
3 A Feature Design for the A-GUARDIAN
The basic principles considered for this paper were discussed in section 2. For a
summary, section 2.1 found that by one side there are few computational counter-
propaganda research and applications for social media. Also, the few instances
found are only plain link spreading bots probably due to the @DroptheIBot effect).
The result for section 2.2 is that false-claims debunking with a political sub-
ject is a popular topic for the Snopes’ readers. For section 2.3, since reports
about false-claims have a better interest distribution than other ratings, this
paper focused on this rating. Due to difficulties in text generation and replying
to sensitive matters such as fake-news as those presented by @DroptheIBot and
TAY, opinion and reply text generation require further research being postponed
for another paper. For direct tweet spread, it prevailed sharing from external
sources behavior. Section 2.4 discusses the need for a bot to earn trust and pop-
ularity to exert influence, which requires relationship building and to avoid the
uncanny valley. It also presented a set of human tweet samples for discussion.
The two major concerns for fake-news bots discussed in 2.5, is to avoid so-
cial media surveillance and effectively spread a fake-news. This is achieved by
simulating human behavior, setting text generation towards a target audience,
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sending the same fake-news several times for amplification aiming to trigger
rumor cascades (the @DroptheIBot effect is not a concern for fake-news bots).
3.1 Basic Concepts (TRL-2)
The surveyed and sampled data presented in section 2 was summarized as the
requirement list presented in table 2. Requirements are the way that program-
ming science distinguishes a research design from a regular design. A regular
design requirement is the result of a negotiation whereas the research design
requirement is not. The result then is evaluated according to how far the design
is from an ideal requirement (or design description).
Therefore, this proposal is not for a full social-bot but just to one feature:
direct almost-link fact-check sharing for debunking reports about false-claims.
Although it requires a logged-in Twitter account for running, this feature is not
for a Twitter-bot. This is due to data shown most of the human direct link
spread is performed through external sources; therefore, like, reply and retweet
behaviors are out of scope for this feature.
Feature: Direct almost-link false-claims debunking fact-check sharing
# Requirement Line
1 Given a list of fact-check reports to share (feed-list), the a-guardian shares
each report through the agency’s sharing feature.
1.4
2 Given a data-set with a desired tone, the a-guardian generates a text
snippet for to be inserted with the link in the tweet.
1.5
3 Given a list of target profiles and a feed-list, the a-guardian selects who to
mention within a tweet (it could be none).
1.6
4 Given a fact-check reports, the a-guardian select those to compose the
feed-list for the next iteration.
1.2
5 After a share-event, the a-guardian sleeps for a certain time 1.7
6 After a sharing iteration, the a-guardian sleeps for a certain time 1.9
Table 2. Feature and associated requirement list, extracted from TRL-1 (section ??)
The sharing feature for the requirements in table 2 is presented in the algo-
rithm 1. This, as any bot, is a thread within a continuous loop that eventually
is put to sleep. The proposed algorithm, given the provided profile, is quite
straightforward however, these simple measures draw the bot nearer to human
behavior, compared to average bots as shown [4]. The preconditions that the
snippetDataset and targetProfiles cannot be empty means that it is not possi-
ble to this bot for spread information without generating snippets nor mentioning
people. In short, this strategy is embedded in this bot’s essence which in turn is
based on the raised profile. The proposed feature is composed of four operations
to fulfill its responsibility placed into a generic Handler class:
– chooseFeed(factCheckList) – This function aims to accomplish requirement #4
however, for understanding about repetition and spacing data must be collected.
For a proportion, politics topic composes at least 25% of a feed-list.
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Algorithm 1 The a-guardian Prototype Algorithm Description.
Require: assertTrue[(social media, logged in), (factCheckList, updated)];
Require: [factCheckList ∧ snippetDataset ∧ targetProfiles] 6= ∅;
1: loop
2: feed ← handler.chooseFeed(factCheckList)








Ensure: ∀ feed ∈ feedList ⊂ bot’s timeline
Ensure: assertTrue(social media, logged out)
– buildSnippet(snippetDataset) – see Snippet Generation.
– sortMentions(targetProfiles) – This function aims to accomplish requirement
#3 however, there are still data to be collected for understanding the mentioning
patterns. The target profiles are those with a larger number of followers.
– sleepingTimeFor(evt=[‘share’, ‘iteration’]) – This function aims to accom-
plish requirements #5 and #6 however, more data should be gathered for under-
stand the mean time between shares and the sharing rhythm in a circadian sense.
Snippet Generation. This discusses the buildSnippet(snippetDataset) function
for accomplish the requirement #2. The aim is to exert influence, which requires
relationship building as a target. Therefore, a proper human-like snippet gener-
ation strategy is a cornerstone. As presented in the figure 2 the sampled tweets
are loose phrases yet loaded with sentiments. Handling short texts is a difficult
task due to the short amount of information for working with [5], this is even
worst for snippets since they are even more reduced texts that may or not be
within proper lexical-syntactic structures and often filled with onomatopoeia.
Given these constraints, a caution is to avoid overtechnology 4.
For a design approach, a text generator may follow either a deterministic or
a statistical approach. Based on the figure 2 the statistical approach would favor
textual patterns, requiring a supervised learning procedure to keep making sense
(and avoiding a TAY-like misbehavior); the deterministic approach would favor
diversity by randomizing template structures yet requiring a CBR procedure for
evolving. Also, the snippet generator can either simulate an individual profile
or a general profile; the statistical approach would suit for the first and the
deterministic for the second. This paper aims the second since the sampled
snippets were not linked with specific profiles.
4 Overtechnology is an anti-pattern similar to overengineering or overuseofpatterns
and related to bleedingedge and goldplating. It is the act of designing an artifact
to be more “technological” than the necessary for its intended use, often due to
marketing purpose or technological obfuscation
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1. [{ } | it’s | the answer is | again | actually | another] ({false | hoax | not true |
no | fake | debunked | lie | fact-check} | nah);
2. [in | this is] <date>;
3. [{please} | just | y’all | worth|{.}|{!}] ({read | stop | listen up} | copy and paste);
4. and [{.}|{!}|{ }| a{f} | #FakeNews | #StopSharingFakenews] for tweet ending.
Fig. 3. Text snippet grammar derived from the snippet data present in figure 2.
The grammar presented in figure 3 was generated based on patterns extracted
from figure 2. A suitable grammar-based mechanism for generating these snip-
pets is to raffle the number of words or punctuation marks to be included before
and after the link (up to four), then, for each word, it raffles the word’s case and
for each punctuation mark the amount to be used. Some tweet instances: NAH
<link> afff , Hoax <link> #StopSharingFakenews, .... !! <link>, <link>
Please please !!!! and DEBUNKED <link>. The sentiment interpretation for a
snippet is left for the tweet reader.
4 Conclusion and Research Hypothesis
Fake-news spreading bots have been using several approaches for deception in
social-media for propaganda effort. The counter-propaganda cannot use most of
these tactics in order to remain ethical. Despite the existence of some shared
approaches, due to their diverse aim, computational propaganda and counter-
propaganda must have distinctive strategies for achieving their goal.
The design proposal presented in algorithm 1 is based on the profile presented
in section 2 and, as a result, it draws nearer to human behavior considering the
properties presented in [4]. In short, the expectation is that algorithm 1 by
simulating human behavior allows people to “recognizes” it as “peer” creating
a social connection enhancing the counter-propaganda effort.
The hypothesis is that a fact-check spread bot gets more attention and exerts
more influence on its followers by simulating human-like behavior compared to
plain “only link” tweeting currently widespread in fact-check agencies and true-
news spreading bots. The algorithm 1 summarizes these paper findings.
For future works, it is expected to gather the missing information in order
to design the lacking operation for providing a complete description of such
behavior. In addition, it is expected to implement the proposed design in order
to collect data to better understand the dynamics of fact-check spreading in
Twitter and eventually improve the bot effectiveness.
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